Blowback, Kosher style

My grandmother was a simple country woman, raised in the hills of West Virginia, without any formal education. A farmer's wife, she helped my grandfather work a small farm on a sunny hillside facing an expanse of rolling blue mountains. Grandma possessed an old-fashioned sense of the inevitability of justice that had nothing to do with religion or fear of legal consequences. For her, there were simply Things You Do Not Do, because the consequences would invariably come back to haunt you later on. So whenever she saw someone Doing one of those Things, it would always be followed by a comment in her Appalachian mountain drawl, "You reap what ye sow."

In the analysis circles that military minds and political wonks travel in, there exists a useful concept known as "blowback", discussed at length in a recent book by Chalmers Johnson. It refers to unintended, negative consequences of a country's covert operations which, after several years, boomerang against that country. In the latter half of the 20th century, the United States saw several such occurrences of blowback. The classic example is Iran, where we supported the former Shah because (1) he provided us with cheap oil, (2) told us he was anti-communist, (3) provided a useful counterweight against some of the Baathist and Arab nationalist regimes, and (4) gave the US military basing rights in a location in the heart of the traditional Soviet sphere of influence. In exchange, the United States provided the Shah with military and political support including arms, training, and intelligence. Suffice it to say that things did not go as planned. For decades, the Shah oppressed the Iranian people, amassed an unspeakable amount of personal wealth, and turned his CIA-trained security service, Savak, into a tool of the state to put down dissent and silence anyone who disagreed with his goals or tactics. The end result, as most Americans are aware, was the 1979 Iranian revolution, the ensuing hostage crisis, and the past 25 years of hair-trigger theocracy in Iran.

Just as the United States was reeling from that reversal in the Middle East, another such blowback opportunity was waiting in the wing. In 1979, the former USSR invaded Afghanistan to prop up a friendly regime that had taken power the year before in a coup. As America watched the Carter administration leave and the Reagan/Bush administration arrive, a new policy approach to the Soviets was unveiled. Under Reagan, the United States would have a more aggressive, muscular policy towards containment of communism - even if no one could articulate what the US strategic interests in Afghanistan happen to be. The practical problems of projecting American military power into Afghanistan, however, were formidable; Afghanistan was part of what both sides had always conceded was the Soviet sphere of influence; the US had just lost the most obvious ally (Iran) from which to operate; and the American public -- fresh off the Vietnam experience and with a hostage crisis in Tehran started only six weeks before -- were in no mood to see US ground troops engaged in a protracted land war on the other side of the globe. The alternative solution was to ignore the previous lessons about blowback and borrow from the Vietnam playbook. The Reagan administration chose to train, support and supply local insurgencies opposed to the Soviet invasion. Their choice? A group of Islamic fundamentalists known as the Taliban, under Osama bin Laden. The Reagan administration continued to fund and train the Taliban throughout the decade of the 1980s, until the Soviets finally withdrew their military from Afghanistan in 1989. Having accomplished their joint goal with the United States of wearing down the Soviet military, the Taliban were liberated to pursue their primary goal of creating an Islamic theocracy. The new administration of George Bush, Sr., like many American administrations, simply had more important things to worry about now that the monochrome threat of communism had been dealt with. Twelve years later the United States would watch as airplanes crashed into buildings and wonder who these people were, and where they came from. But even before 9/11, it was known that Osama bin Laden would be trouble.

Other examples of blowback exist: Vietnam, Saddam Hussein, The Philippines, etc. but lest anyone think that Americans have a monopoly on blowback, consider recent events in the Middle East. As it turns out, the Hamas organization was funded and most likely created by Israel. That is not the ravings of a conspiracy; it reflects the comments of rather well-connected people who are in a position to know:

Israel "aided Hamas directly -- the Israelis wanted to use it as a counterbalance to the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization)," said Tony Cordesman, Middle East analyst for the Center for Strategic Studies.

Israel's support for Hamas "was a direct attempt to divide and dilute support for a strong, secular PLO by using a competing religious alternative," said a former senior CIA official.

I have often remarked on how useful the existence of Hamas has been to the Likud party and to the right wing in Israel. Hamas provides an external enemy to rally the public and excuse the sins of the government. Hamas gives the settlers - who ally themselves with the conservative political groups in Israel - something to focus their fanaticism. Israeli politics is tightly wrapped; without an external threat, the wrappings would relax and the internal divisions that have been smoothed over by the external threat would surface. The Israeli public might have to stop and consider some of the contradictions between its declared intent to be (1) a uniquely Jewish state and (2) a democracy at the same time. Without Hamas, Israel might enter in a period of soul-searching about the inequities of its society and the different way it treats Jewish Israelis vs. Arab Israelis and non-Jews. Hard questions about the morality of occupying and trying to absorb towns with Arab populations of 90% or more would have to be answered. But fortunately, Hamas is there to prevent all that introspection; my how convenient. Cui bono?

Now it appears that the Israelis are experiencing blowback of their own.

"The thinking on the part of some of the right-wing Israeli establishment was that Hamas and the others, if they gained control, would refuse to have any part of the peace process and would torpedo any agreements put in place," said a U.S. government official who asked not to be named.

"Israel would still be the only democracy in the region for the United States to deal with," he said.

Let's linger over that point for a moment. As cervantes states it quite clearly, the Israelis did not in fact want peace, but rather the permanent acquisition of Palestinian territory, and so they did not want to be placed in a position where international pressure to deal with the PLO became irresistible.

All of which disgusts some former U.S. intelligence officials.

"The thing wrong with so many Israeli operations is that they try to be too sexy," said former CIA official Vincent Cannestraro.

According to former State Department counter-terrorism official Larry Johnson, "the Israelis are their own worst enemies when it comes to fighting terrorism."

"The Israelis are like a guy who sets fire to his hair and then tries to put it out by hitting it with a hammer."

"They do more to incite and sustain terrorism than curb it," he said.

Apparently Israel is getting ready to learn the lesson my grandmother already knew: consequences - like the two dozen or so chickens she raised -- always come home to roost.

Who will likely be the benefactor of this blowback, other than Hamas? The Likud party, whose former leader, Ariel Sharon, lies in a coma, leaving his newly formed party, Kadima, rudderless and facing elections. Likud's current leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, has wasted no time positioning the Hamas victory as an indictment against Sharon's policies, the withdrawal from Gaza, and the removal of settlements on the West Bank.